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I. Introduction
In December 1999, Douglas Ivester stepped down as
CEO of Coca-Cola after serving only 2 years at the
helm. The question posed in the Wall Street Journal
was, “So fast?” (McKay and Deogun 1999, p. B1). The
same question could have been asked 3 months later
when Mattel dismissed Jill Barad after she had been its
CEO for only 3 years (Lublin and Bannon 2000). These
are just two highly publicized examples of a somewhat
surprising empirical regularity: a substantial percentage
of CEO turnovers occur in the first few years of the
CEO’s tenure (e.g., Sebora 1996; Allgood and Farrell
2000). These early turnovers are surprising because ev-
idence suggests that, in a given year, the likelihood of
CEO turnover is very low (e.g., Warner, Watts, and
Wruck 1988; Weisbach 1988; Parrino 1997). In addi-
tion, CEO turnover can be a traumatic event for a firm,
making the choice of CEO one of the most important
hiring decisions the firm makes (Kesner and Sebora
1994).
Sebora (1996) finds that 34% of all CEO tenures in
his sample ended by the CEO’s fourth year. Job match
theory can provide an explanation of why many CEOs
leave their positions within a few years of assuming
* We appreciate the helpful comments and suggestions from an
anonymous referee, Albert Madansky (editor), Kim Marie Mc-
Goldrick, Colin Ramsay, and seminar participants at the Southern
Economic Association Meetings and the University of Ne-
braska—Lincoln. Kathleen Farrell appreciates receiving partial sup-
port from the 1999 Hicks Foundation Summer Research Grant. We
are responsible for all errors in the manuscript.
We investigate the role of
job-match heterogeneity
in the CEO labor market.
We document a high per-
centage of CEO turnovers
in the early years of ten-
ure as illustrated by the
hazard that increases until
the fifth year of CEO
tenure and then de-
creases. Evidence sug-
gests that a good match
is more likely if the new
CEO performs better than
the previous CEO. The
best matches tend to oc-
cur when inside (outside)
CEOs follow previous
CEOs who quit (are dis-
missed). Evidence consis-
tent with match theory in
the CEO labor market
suggests factors that in-
fluence the likelihood of
observing a good match.
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them. According to match theory, workers who otherwise appear equivalent
differ in their productivity because of heterogeneity across firms in the quality
of job matches. The implication is that good matches are more productive than
bad matches. Of course, labor economists are not the only ones who recognize
the importance of matching the “right” worker to the “right” job. Management
consultants, for example, emphasize that matching senior people to a job is
difficult (Gerstein and Reisman 1983). The finance literature on CEO turnover,
however, focuses primarily on monitoring mechanisms of the CEO, including
the role of the board of directors (BODs) and blockholders in dismissing poorly
performing CEOs, and on the quality of the CEO (e.g., Weisbach 1988; Yermack
1996; Perry 2000). Match theory begins with the notion that there are no good
workers or good employers; there are only good matches (Jovanovic 1979a).
This is not to imply that monitoring and matching are mutually inconsistent
theories. Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), for example, develop a model that
incorporates both uncertain match quality and monitoring, but the focus of their
model is on the monitoring role of the board. We seek to test some of the
implications of job match theory for the CEO labor market.1
We do not suggest that all CEO turnovers can be explained by match theory.
Economists have developed a variety of models to explain turnover in the labor
market, and it is naive to assume that there is one explanation for this phe-
nomenon. However, the usefulness of thinking about CEO turnover in the job
match context is to better understand why we observe such a high percentage
of CEO turnovers in the early years of tenure. The high percentage of turnovers
is significant when one considers the potential disruption of CEO turnover to
the firm. If match theory applies to the CEO labor market, then we can determine
what factors might help influence the likelihood of observing a good match.
Job match theory stresses the importance of the entire CEO succession process,
as opposed to focusing solely on how to motivate or monitor CEOs once chosen.
While it can be difficult to differentiate the empirical implications of match
theory from other theories of labor market mobility (Garen 1988), we do find
evidence that job-match heterogeneity is present in the CEO labor market. First,
we find that the hazard increases until the fifth year of CEO tenure and then
decreases. This is the shape predicted by Jovanovic’s (1979b) model of job
match, but it is not the one predicted by other theories of labor market turnover
(Farber 1999).
One advantage of studying CEOs is that it affords a proxy for the quality of
the job match. Instead of viewing firm performance as a measure of whether
or not the CEO is doing a good job, match theory suggests that good matches
are characterized by better firm performance than are bad matches. Bishop
(1990) takes a similar approach in using supervisor evaluations as a direct
measure of match quality. Thus, match theory is an alternative explanation for
why firm performance is negatively related to the likelihood of turnover (e.g.,
1. Several recent papers (Hayes and Schaefer 1999; Fee and Hadlock 2000) also mention
match theory in relation to CEOs. None of these papers, however, explicitly test matching.
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Warner et al. 1988; Weisbach 1988; Parrino 1997). Another advantage of stud-
ying CEOs is the ability to compare two individuals in the same position with
the same firm. If turnovers occur because of poor match quality, then good
matches should be characterized by firm performance that is higher under the
new CEO than under the previous CEO. In fact, we find that a good match is
more likely if firm performance is higher under the new CEO than it was under
the previous CEO.
Finally, we conduct a more explicit test of match theory. Khurana and
Nohria (2000) argue that, independent of ability, firm performance is partially
determined by the interaction of the type of previous CEO turnover (quit or
dismissal) and the origin of the new CEO (inside or outside hire). For example,
outside CEOs are more likely to change the status quo, and the incumbent
management will be more responsive to these changes if the previous CEO
was dismissed than if the CEO quit. Based on this reasoning, Khurana and
Nohria argue that replacing a dismissed CEO with an outside hire will improve
firm performance. We interpret this as a matching argument because the pro-
ductivity of CEOs with similar ability will differ across firms. We find that
inside replacements are more likely to be dismissed if the previous CEO was
dismissed than if the previous CEO quit.
While our results support the hypothesis that job-match heterogeneity is
present in the CEO labor market, we also document differences with typical
match theory. We find little evidence that CEOs choose to quit because they
are in a bad match. Quits in the CEO labor market arise primarily due to
retirements and not because the CEO is leaving for alternative jobs with higher
pay. We argue that this follows from the downward rigidity of CEO com-
pensation and the absence of alternative wage offers at the CEO level. Also,
the hazard depicts the shape predicted by the job match model, but the peak
in the hazard occurs at approximately 5 years of CEO tenure, whereas Farber’s
(1994) study of the non-CEO labor market finds that the hazard peaks at 3
months. We argue that the CEO labor market and the typical labor market
differ significantly in regard to evaluation of performance and cost of turnover.
We begin with a brief exposition of the job match model in Section II.
After discussing the applicability of the model to the CEO labor market, we
then discuss predictions about CEO turnover that arise from job match theory
in Section III. Section IV includes a discussion of our data set and descriptive
statistics. We test the job match model using multinomial logit models in
Section V. Section VI concludes this article.
II. Job Match Model and the CEO Labor Market
Garen (1988) provides a simple description of job match theory.2 Job match
models assume heterogeneity in the productivity of worker-firm matches and
2. Most models of job match rely on Bayesian techniques and dynamic optimization. See,
e.g., Jovanovic (1979a, 1979b); Miller (1984).
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that the quality of these matches is not initially known by either party. Firms
and workers learn about the quality of the match early in the worker’s tenure,
so that only good matches endure because bad matches end quickly. Those
with long tenures are in good matches and are less likely to find a better
match, and therefore they are less likely to quit. Empirical studies of the
relationship between tenure and turnover have met with only limited success
in differentiating the importance of job-match heterogeneity from other the-
ories (Garen 1988).3 The evidence does suggest, however, that job-match
heterogeneity plays a nontrivial role in explaining the relationship between
tenure and turnover.
In his seminal paper on matching in labor markets, Jovanovic (1979b)
outlines three primary assumptions to set up his model. First, workers differ
in their productivity across jobs. This first assumption is the key component
of all job match models, and it seems very applicable to the CEO labor market.
It seems reasonable, for example, that an executive with a successful history
as a “turn-around specialist” would be less successful at a firm that is finan-
cially and organizationally sound (e.g., Gerstein and Reisman 1983).
Second, Jovanovic (1979b) assumes that imperfect information exists on
both sides of the market about the quality of the job match. In their analysis
of CEOs, Gibbons and Murphy (1992) test a model that employs a learning
process that is similar to that used by Jovanovic. Gibbons and Murphy, how-
ever, focus on learning about the CEO from the firm’s perspective.4 Job match
models assume that the worker is imperfectly informed about match quality
as well and this means that the worker may choose to quit because he is in
a match of lower than expected quality.
Third, Jovanovic (1979b) assumes that workers and employers negotiate
wages on an individual basis. While the assumption of wage negotiation seems
realistic on the surface, the actual manner in which CEO compensation is
negotiated and the form of this compensation differs from that typically found
in the job match literature. Job match models often assume that wages are
flexible and that they are negotiated each period (Jovanovic 1979a, 1979b;
McLaughlin 1991). Most CEOs are paid a base salary plus bonuses and long-
term incentive compensation that is tied to measurable indicators of firm
performance (Murphy 1999). According to Murphy, the executive employment
contract often includes a guaranteed minimum increase in base salary over
the subsequent 5-year period. Not surprisingly, we rarely observe pay cuts in
the CEO labor market, suggesting that CEO compensation is downwardly
rigid (Hayes and Schaefer 1999). The presence of downwardly rigid wages
3. Human capital theory is another explanation for why turnover decreases with tenure. If
some component of the human capital developed on a job is specific to the firm, the worker’s
productivity and wage increase with tenure at the current firm. Because the accumulated human
capital is firm specific, the worker’s productivity is likely to be higher at the current firm than
at the next best alternative, and they are less likely to quit as tenure increases.
4. Murphy (1986) also tests the learning hypothesis regarding wage determination for CEOs.
Similar to Gibbons and Murphy (1992), his focus is on learning about the CEO from the firm’s
perspective.
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does not mean that the job match model is inappropriate for studying CEOs,
but it does have an influence on the predictions of the model.
The presence of downwardly rigid wages has implications for labeling
turnovers as quits or dismissals. Given sufficiently flexible wages, job match
models have the property that all turnovers arise because workers quit. If
realized productivity is less than expected, the firm offers a lower wage. If
the lower wage offer is less than the next best alternative, the worker quits.
A similar process results in a quit if the worker’s productivity is greater than
expected. Job match models are often “silent on the division of the total
separations into the categories of quits and layoffs” (Jovanovic 1979a, p.
1251). The CEO turnover literature, however, emphasizes the distinction be-
tween quits and dismissals.
Is there a theoretical justification for classifying turnovers as quits and
dismissals? McLaughlin (1991) takes a novel approach and defines a quit as
occurring from a separation following a worker-initiated wage change. A
dismissal is a separation following a firm-initiated wage change. Flexible
wages result in turnover that is voluntary to both the worker and the firm. If
wages are not sufficiently flexible, however, some turnovers are involuntary
for either the worker or the firm. Bishop (1990) also argues that firms may
have reasons, such as worker morale, for dismissing workers instead of low-
ering wages. Harris and Weiss (1984) analyze a model with match hetero-
geneity where they assume risk aversion along with a finite retirement age.
They find that one characteristic of the equilibrium of their model is down-
wardly rigid wages. As a result, not all turnovers will be voluntary for the
workers. With this theoretical foundation, we proceed under the assumption
that the distinction between quits and dismissals is relevant in the CEO labor
market.
There are other aspects of the CEO labor market that differ from the typical
labor market depicted using the job match model. First, turnover in job match
models occurs because the worker receives an alternative wage offer that
exceeds the wage offer of the incumbent firm. This is not descriptive of the
CEO labor market, given the small number of firm-to-firm CEO changes
observed (Gibbons and Murphy 1992; Hayes and Schaefer 1999). Exiting
CEOs almost always exit the CEO labor market, although they may remain
on the BODs. Job match models typically abstract from the issue of workers
retiring from the labor force by assuming an infinitely lived worker. The
workers in our sample, however, are older and nearing retirement. Therefore,
we include an age variable in our empirical work.
Second, job match models assume that the quality of the match is learned
over time but that the actual value of the match is fixed. For CEOs, the
productivity of a given set of skills with a firm may change over time as a
firm evolves or as upper management and the BODs changes, or as industry
and market conditions change.5 Gibbons and Murphy (1992) suggest that
5. For example, Gerstein and Reisman (1983) asked a senior executive why his firm dismissed
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changes in the firm or its environment may require the BODs to “relearn”
about the CEO’s ability. Because we do not know when these changes occur
within a firm, changing match quality is difficult to account for empirically.
III. Empirical Implications
Below we outline some predictions of the job match model. Our primary
interest is to better understand the role of job-match heterogeneity in explain-
ing why many CEOs leave the position within a few years. Therefore, we
focus most of the empirical analysis on the first years of a CEO’s tenure. An
advantage of this approach is that it allows us to abstract from the compli-
cations that could arise because of changes in match quality.
A. Tenure as CEO
Two empirical regularities of labor markets explained by the job match model
are that (1) most new job matches end early and (2) the likelihood of separation
decreases with tenure (Farber 1999). Jovanovic’s (1979b) model predicts that
the hazard initially increases and then decreases. The hazard has this shape
because early signals of a poor job match might be ignored “because there
is an option value in the match (it might turn out to be very good)” (Farber
1999, p. 2413). Initial separation rates are very low but, as learning occurs,
separation rates increase because bad matches are terminated. After this time
of weeding out, separation rates decline.
While match theory predicts a hazard that increases and then decreases,
agency theory alone makes no obvious prediction regarding tenure and turn-
over. If learning takes place but there is no job-match heterogeneity, the hazard
would monotonically decrease with tenure. Previous research (e.g., Kim 1996;
Denis, Denis, and Sarin 1997; Allgood and Farrell 2000) finds conflicting
evidence regarding the relation between CEO tenure and turnover. Denis et
al. (1997) find no statistically significant relation between tenure and the
likelihood of top executive turnover. Allgood and Farrell (2000), however,
find that new CEOs (those with 1–3 years of tenure) are more likely to be
dismissed than are CEOs with 4–10 years of tenure. Those CEOs with more
than 10 years are less likely to be dismissed.6
B. Firm Performance
Perhaps the most accepted empirical regularity in the literature on CEO turn-
over is that the likelihood of turnover is negatively related to firm performance
(Murphy 1999). The typical interpretation of this result is that the BOD dis-
misses poorly performing CEOs. To the extent that firm performance is a
a successful manager. The response was this: “Some people are better at starting things up, some
are better at squeezing the most out of them once they are running, and some are better at fixing
them when they go wrong” (p. 33).
6. Kim (1996) also finds that CEOs with more than 10 years of tenure are less likely to be
dismissed.
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measure of match quality, poor performance suggests a bad match and, there-
fore, CEO turnover is more likely. Thus, job match theory also implies a
negative relationship between performance and turnover (Bishop 1990).
Data on firm performance under the previous CEO provides an additional
test of match theory. If turnover is due to bad matches that have low pro-
ductivity, then the hiring of a new CEO who is a good match will lead to
higher performance than under the previous CEO. That is, the likelihood of
early turnover should be lower if the firm performs better under the new CEO
than it did under the previous CEO.
C. The Previous CEOs
A unique aspect of studying CEOs is the ability to make comparisons across
employees holding the same position with the same firm. For example, Parrino
(1997) finds a link between firm performance under the previous CEO and
who is chosen as the replacement. Specifically, he finds that firms performing
poorly relative to the rest of their industry are more likely to hire an outside
CEO. Khurana and Nohria (2000) argue that firm performance is affected by
the interaction of type of CEO turnover (quit vs. dismissal) and whether the
replacement CEO is an insider or an outsider. The authors argue that the
remaining incumbent management will be more responsive to change when
the previous CEO was dismissed. In this case, an outside CEO can more
effectively institute change, and firm performance will improve. Conversely,
an inside replacement will find it difficult to institute change, and firm per-
formance will decrease if the previous CEO was dismissed. Hiring an inside
CEO after the previous CEO quits only reinforces the status quo. Khurana
and Nohria hypothesize that this succession process will not change firm
performance. If an outsider is brought in to replace a voluntarily departing
CEO, then “a likely split develops between the internal managers of the firm
and the outsider” (p. 11).7
This line of reasoning suggests that match quality is partially explained by
the interaction of the type of previous CEO turnover and the origin of the
new CEO. If this interaction is important in the CEO labor market, we expect
inside hires who follow dismissed CEOs to have shorter tenures than inside
hires who follow CEOs who quit. We would also expect outside hires to have
shorter tenures when following CEOs who quit than when following dismissed
CEOs.
D. Other Unobserved Heterogeneity
Aside from job-match heterogeneity, heterogeneity in labor markets often
refers to workers who may differ in their quit propensity (Garen 1988). One
method to control for this unobserved heterogeneity is to include a variable
7. Khurana and Nohria (2000) document improvements in firm performance when the CEO
is forced from office and replaced by an outsider and declines in firm performance when a CEO
quits or retires and is then replaced by an outsider.
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for the number of jobs the worker has held (Farber 1994). Given that most
CEOs are hired from within a firm after years of firm tenure, this type of
heterogeneity seems less relevant in the CEO labor market. In addition, few
turnovers occur in the CEO labor market due to a CEO leaving for an alter-
native CEO position. Differences in the quit behavior of outside CEOs, how-
ever, may indicate the presence of heterogeneity in the propensity to quit. In
the CEO labor market, we argue that unobserved heterogeneity may also arise
from firms having a different turnover propensity. That is, a previous CEO
with a short tenure may suggest that a firm is more active in inducing turnover.
Thus, we use the tenure of the previous CEO as a control for firms that may
differ in their turnover propensities.
IV. The Sample
Unlike many previous studies of CEO turnover, the unit of observation for
our analysis is the CEO-firm match. For each job match, our data set contains
only one observation. Studies such as those by Warner et al. (1988), Parrino
(1997), and DeFond and Park (1999) have multiple observations for each
CEO. We treat each match as a single observation because we are interested
in the likelihood that a match between the CEO and the firm ends in the first
3 years of tenure and not in the likelihood of turnover in a given CEO year.
A. Description of the Sample
Since our focus is on analyzing job matches, we initially identify a sample
of firms from the Forbes Annual Survey of Executive Compensation and
include any firms that appear in Forbes in the period 1981–93.8 For each firm,
we identify CEO turnovers that occur during the entire 14-year sample period.
This process yields a total of 1,524 firms, with 875 firms experiencing 1,388
CEO turnovers prior to any data restrictions. Since the factors influencing a
CEO job match may be systematically different between regulated firms and
unregulated firms, we eliminate financial institutions and public utilities from
the sample.9
In addition to identifying CEO turnovers, we must also determine the reason
for the turnover. We classify turnovers as dismissals or quits on the basis of
information from the Wall Street Journal Index. We categorize as quits all
CEO turnovers arising from retirement, normal management succession, or
8. For firms that do not appear in Forbes every year, we analyze proxy statements to the
extent that they are available to determine the CEO in office.
9. Smith and Watts (1992) and Gaver and Gaver (1993) provide evidence that the marginal
product of the manager as a decision maker in a regulated industry is lower than that of a manager
in an unregulated industry. We define regulated industries, consistent with Blackwell and Farrell
(1999), as SIC codes 6000–6999 and 4900–4999.
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CEO departure for a prestigious position elsewhere.10 After identifying all
retirements, we further analyze turnovers identified as retirements for CEOs
younger than 62 years of age to determine if the announced retirement is
simply a euphemism for a firing. We read the Wall Street Journal article or
other press releases relating to the company and the turnover event to deter-
mine if any other information is released to suggest a reason for the turnover
other than retirement, and we reclassify accordingly. We define dismissal as
forced resignations owing to pressure from the board of directors, pressure
from outside blockholders, pressure from bank lenders, policy or personality
disagreements, demotion, firing, scandal, poor performance, bankruptcy, and
reorganization.11 When no reason for the turnover is given, we follow Parrino
(1997) by using CEO age to categorize the turnover as either a quit or a
dismissal. To minimize the likelihood of incorrectly classifying quits as dis-
missals, we assume that all turnovers for which no reason is given and in
which the CEO is younger than 60 years of age are dismissals. Otherwise,
they are classified as quits.12
We exclude from the sample any turnovers that result from an interim CEO’s
being replaced. This is done for current and previous CEOs. Interim CEOs
often assume the CEO position when an unexpected turnover occurs, such as
death or illness. The factors influencing the selection of an interim CEO are
likely to be very different from the factors influencing the selection of a
permanent CEO. Similarly, we exclude CEOs who leave the sample due to
merger, acquisition, bankruptcy, leveraged buyouts, or reorganization of the
firm. Again, the factors associated with firms that experience these events are
likely to be systematically different from those of surviving firms. Our analysis
requires data on the previous CEO; consequently, for a job match to remain
in the data set, there must be a previous turnover at the firm in the data set.
The previous turnover requirement causes us to exclude founders from the
analysis of a job match, since typically founders are the initial CEOs of a
firm. However, founders may remain in the data set as previous CEOs. Each
observation consists of data on the CEO whose length of tenure is being
analyzed, referred to as the current CEO. Each observation also contains data
on the CEO immediately preceding the current CEO, referred to as the previous
CEO. Further, the current CEO job match must either have terminated by
10. Normal management succession refers to turnovers that evolve over time where the
announcement typically suggests that the turnover is part of a planned succession or that an
individual is being groomed to take over the CEO position at a specified date. Prestigious
appointment elsewhere relates to CEOs leaving one Fortune 500 company for a CEO position
at another Fortune 500 company.
11. Our scheme for classifying dismissals and quits is based on the voluntary and forced
classifications used by Weisbach (1988), Gilson (1989), Parrino (1997), and Blackwell and Farrell
(1999). Death and illness of the CEO are typically classified as voluntary turnovers; however,
for purposes of analyzing job matches, these reasons are not synonymous with quits, so these
turnovers are excluded from the current CEO job match sample.
12. Denis and Denis (1995) also include “no reason given” as a forced CEO turnover if it
involves an external appointment and the departing manager leaves the firm and is not between
the ages of 64 and 66.
326 Journal of Business
1993 or the CEO’s tenure must be greater than 3 years in 1993. In addition,
firms must be listed on Compustat with complete performance data available
for the applicable period. CEO tenure, firm tenure, and age data must be
available through Forbes, proxy statements, Dunn and Bradstreet’s Reference
Book of Corporate Management, or Dunn and Bradstreet’s Million Dollar
Directory.
The final data set consists of 392 job matches. Of the 392 job matches,
309 (79%) endure beyond 3 years and therefore are classified as good matches.
Eighty-three (21%) end in the first 3 years of a CEO’s tenure and are defined
as bad matches. Quits make up 35 of the bad matches, and dismissals account
for the remaining 48. Our sample size appears small relative to those of
previous studies analyzing the likelihood of CEO turnover in a given year.
However, our unit of observation is a job match and not a CEO year. In
addition, we require information regarding the previous CEO, which imposes
a minimum requirement of one CEO turnover for each firm in our sample.
We define two performance measures, the return on assets (ROA), measured
as the ratio of accounting earnings before interest and taxes to book assets,
and stock returns (Return). Both of these measures are industry adjusted. We
subtract the median value of the corresponding firm performance measure
from the two-digit SIC code industry definition in which the firm participates,
as defined by Compustat. We use the two-digit SIC code to industry adjust
because Clarke (1989) finds that two-digit SIC codes capture similar general
economic characteristics better than three- and four-digit SIC codes.
During the transition year from the previous to the current CEO, firm-
specific variables must be assigned to either the current or the previous CEO.
We assign any fractional year to the CEO in office at the end of the fiscal
year. Firm performance and sales, for example, for the previous CEO reflect
that CEO’s last full year in office. Performance and sales in the first year of
a current CEO may partially reflect the performance of the previous CEO.
Ideally, we would assign partial years to CEOs. While monthly stock return
data are available, the data for calculating ROA on a monthly basis are not
available. As a result, we adopt the same procedure with both performance
measures, so that treatment of the transition year is consistent across both
performance measures.
For current CEOs, we are interested in individual and firm characteristics
from the CEOs’ first 3 years in office. When we construct the variables to
use in the analysis, we define the variables age, firm tenure, and sales as the
CEO’s last year or third year in office, whichever comes first. If a current
CEO has been in office for more than 3 years, we still use data from his or
her first 3 years of CEO tenure. We define Average ROA as the average of
the firm’s industry-adjusted ROA over, at most, the first 3 years of tenure.
For example, if a CEO is dismissed the second year of his or her tenure,
average ROA is the average of the first 2 years of tenure. Average return is
similarly calculated, but it is for the firm’s industry-adjusted stock return. We
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choose average measures of performance to examine the impact of perform-
ance over a longer time period.13
Average ROA and average return for the previous CEO are for (at most)
the last 3 years of the previous CEO’s tenure.14 We also construct two per-
formance measures that capture the difference in performance of the current
CEO and the previous CEO. The variables defined as ROA difference and
return difference are the industry-adjusted average performance of the current
CEO minus the industry-adjusted average performance of the previous CEO
for ROA and stock return, respectively.
B. Descriptive Statistics
The full-sample descriptive statistics are given in the first two columns of
table 1. The average CEO is about 56 years of age and has a firm tenure of
slightly less than 21 years. Approximately 18% of the current CEOs were
hired from outside the firm, where an outside CEO is a CEO that assumes
the position within 1 year of joining the firm. The average firm has sales of
approximately $5,500 million. Average industry-adjusted ROA is approxi-
mately 3%, and average industry-adjusted return is about 7.7%. Six percent
of the previous CEOs were founders, and the average previous CEO tenure
was 10.5 years. Twenty-seven percent of the previous CEOs were dismissed,
and 12% of the previous CEOs left office within 3 years of taking the po-
sition.15 The average ROA of the previous CEO is about the same as the
average ROA of the current CEO, but the average return of the previous CEO
is about 270 basis points lower than that of the current CEO (the difference
is statistically different from zero at the 6% level).
Columns 3–8 of table 1 provide the mean and standard deviation of the
variables for the different match outcomes of the current CEO. Firm size,
age, and firm tenure do not vary much between good and bad matches. Early
turnover is more likely with outside CEOs, and performance is lower for the
bad match sample. The difference in performance between good and bad
matches, however, is driven primarily by the lower performance of CEOs
who are dismissed. To the extent that performance proxies for the quality of
the match, CEOs who quit early are not worse matches than those that last
beyond 3 years. This result is consistent with CEO dismissal arising from the
13. Brickley, Linck, and Coles (1999) define two of their performance measures as average
annual industry-adjusted ROA and average annual industry-adjusted stock returns over the CEO’s
tenure in office or the last 4 years in office, whichever is less. Puffer and Weintrop (1991) use
the average ROA over a 5-year period to measure long-run performance.
14. In some cases, we had less than 3 years of data on the previous CEO. If we had 2 years
of data, we calculated the 2-year average, and if we had only 1 year we used 1 year. We measure
previous performance over a 3-year period since the most recent performance of the CEO is
what matters (e.g., Warner et al. 1988; Weisbach 1988).
15. There is an upward bias in our overall dismissal rate due to the exclusion of some turnovers
typically classified as voluntary (quits). For example, we exclude turnovers arising from death,
illness, or interim status from the sample.
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TABLE 1 Descriptive Statistics
Current CEO
Full Sample Good Match Bad Match Bad Match–Dismissed Bad Match–Quit
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Current CEO:
Age 55.67 6.39 55.48 6.13 56.39 7.28 52.96b, c 6.42 61.09b 5.62
Firm tenure 20.74 13.04 21.19 12.59 19.07 15.49 16.88b 13.19 22.09 16.02
Outside .18 .38 .16 .36 .25 .44 .23 .42 .29b .46
Sales ($ millions) 5,521.83 10,480.10 5,640.23 9,870.68 5,081.02 12,550.20 3,463.62 4,705.64 7,299.18 18,452.80
Average ROA .0309 .0999 .0417 .0798 .0094 .1470 .0393b, c .1689 .0316 .0985
Average return .0770 .2187 .0970 .2058 .0024 .2487 .0312b .2722 .0484 .2074
Previous CEO:
Founder .0612 .24 .0615 .2406 .0602 .2394 .0208c .1443 .1143 .3228
CEO tenure 10.51 7.78 10.78 7.74 9.51 7.91 8.48 6.95 10.91 8.98
Bad match .1199 .3253 .0939 .2921 .2169 .4146 .2500b .4376 .1714 .3824
Dismisseda .2679 .4434 .2492 .4332 .3373 .4757 .3958 .4842 .2571 .4434
Average ROA .0336 .0911 .0394 .0879 .0119 .0997 .0045b, c .1031 .0344 .0916
Average return .0497 .2006 .0535 .1954 .0354 .2192 .0249 .2263 .0499 .2116
AROADIFF .0027 .0818 .0022 .0697 .0214 .1151 .0348b,  .1406 .0028 .0631
ARETDIFF .0273 .2779 .0435 .2681 .0330 .3059 .0560 .3250 .0015 .2791
N 392 309 83 48 35
Note.—The unit of observation is the CEO-firm match, and the final sample consists of 392 job matches. Three hundred and nine (79%) of job matches endure beyond 3 years and are
classified as good matches. Eighty-three (21%) of job matches end in the first 3 years of a CEO’s tenure and are defined as bad matches. Statistics for age, firm tenure, and sales are for the
third year of the CEO’s tenure or for his or her last year in office, whichever comes first. Outside identifies CEOs initially hired from outside the firm and is defined as a CEO who assumes
the position within 1 year of joining the firm. Founder identifies CEOs who are founders of the firm. CEO tenure is measured as the previous CEO’s last year in office. Bad match is defined
as a CEO tenure that ends in the first 3 years. Quits represent all CEO turnovers arising from retirement, normal management succession, or those involving the CEO’s departure for a
prestigious position elsewhere. Dismissals are forced resignations owing to pressure from the board of directors, pressure from outside blockholders, pressure from bank lenders, policy or
personality disagreements, demotion, firing, scandal, poor performance, bankruptcy, and reorganization. All turnovers for which no reason is given and the CEO is younger than 60 years of
age are classified as dismissals; otherwise, they are classified as quits. Average ROA (return) is the average industry-adjusted ROA (stock return) for, at most, the first (last) 3 years of the
current (previous) CEO’s tenure. AROADIFF (ARETDIFF) is the average ROA (average return) for the current CEO minus the average ROA (average return) for the previous CEO.
a The dismissed category does not restrict the previous CEO sample to bad matches. We include reasons for turnovers for all previous CEO turnovers in our sample, even for those that
occur after 3 years of CEO tenure and that are included in the good match category.
b The mean value is statistically different from the mean value of the same variable for the good match sample at (at least) the 10% significance level.
c The mean value is statistically different from the mean value of the same variable for the bad match ends in quit sample at (at least) the 10% level.
 Statistically significant at the 10% level.
CEO/Firm Match 329
board monitoring and removing poorly performing CEOs. The result is also
consistent with job match theory. For a CEO in a bad match to choose to
quit, we would expect wages to be downwardly flexible and the CEO to be
receiving alternative wage offers. These characteristics do not describe the
CEO labor market. Thus, a CEO has little incentive to terminate a bad match,
unless it is to retire. As table 1 shows, CEO age is one of the few differences
between CEOs who quit (61) and those who are good matches (55).
Firm size is about the same for good matches ($5,640 million) and bad
matches ($5,081 million), but dismissals occur at firms with lower sales
($3,464 million), although the differences are not statistically significant.
Bishop (1990) finds that matching between firms and workers (not CEOs) is
less important at larger firms. Hayes and Schaefer (1999) find evidence that
larger firms hire CEOs of higher ability. Mean sales for the data are consistent
with the interpretation that, if CEOs at larger firms are more able and matching
is less important, early dismissal is less likely at larger firms.
Analyzing variables associated with the previous CEO in table 1, early
turnover of the previous CEO is associated with early turnover for the current
CEO. Again, the difference between good and bad matches is mostly driven
by dismissals of the current CEO. One-fourth of the current CEO dismissals
in the first 3 years follow CEOs who were dismissed within 3 years of taking
office. This result is consistent with firms having differences in their propensity
to induce CEO turnover.
When analyzing changes in firm performance as measured by differences
in ROA and return between the current and previous CEO, we find that current
CEOs who are bad matches perform worse than the previous CEO. Again,
dismissals explain most of this difference. Current CEOs who are good
matches experience significant improvements in return relative to the previous
CEO. However, unlike the good match sample, CEOs who quit in the first 3
years of tenure do not improve on return. Those CEOs who are good matches
with the firm tend to perform better than the previous CEO, suggesting that
performance improvement indicates a better job match.
C. The Hazard
Match theory suggests that the likelihood of turnover in the next year is
conditional on how long a given match has been ongoing. Consider a newly
hired CEO. Let T denote the time (measured in years) until this CEO’s turnover
occurs. Following Lancaster (1990), T is assumed to be a continuous random
variable with cumulative distribution function , survival func-F(t)p P(Tp t)
tion , and probability density functionS(t)p 1–F(t)p P(T 1 t) f (t)p
. Rather than looking at the probability distribution of T, match theorydF(t)/dt
would have us look at how prone a CEO is to depart, having worked con-
tinuously for t years at the same company, that is, at the conditional distribution
and density of T given that . This conditional density, called the hazardT ≥ t
function, is given by By comparison, the gives theh(t)p f (t)/S(t). f (t)dt
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Fig. 1.—The hazard function for 873 CEOs
probability that a newly hired CEO remains with the company for t years and
then leaves soon after time The hazard function and the probability densityt.
function are connected via the equation Following Kiefer’sh(t)p f (t)/S(t).
(1988) estimator (p. 659), we estimate the hazard function by dividing the
number of job matches that end at t by the number of matches still ongoing
at t.
Figure 1 provides the hazard rate for 873 CEOs for each year of tenure.
The sample is larger than the 392 observations used for the other statistical
analysis because we do not need separate information on the previous CEO
and can actually use the previous CEO data to provide information regarding
completed spells. In addition, we only need CEO tenure to estimate the hazard
function and avoid losing observations due to unavailable data.
Jovanovic (1979b) develops a job match model that predicts a hazard that
initially increases and then decreases. Consistent with Jovanovic, figure 1
shows that the hazard initially increases to a peak at 5 years of tenure and
decreases thereafter. Farber (1994) studies the labor market mobility of youths
using the National Longitudinal Study of Youth (NLSY) and finds that the
monthly hazard reaches a peak at 3 months and decreases thereafter. Farber
reports a peak monthly hazard of 9.67%, which is slightly larger than the 8%
annual hazard in figure 1.16 The difference in the timing of the peaks likely
reflects that it takes longer to learn about match quality for CEOs than for
16. Sebora (1996) finds that the hazard has a similar shape for his sample of CEOs. His peak
is at approximately 9% and begins the decline after 4 years of CEO tenure.
CEO/Firm Match 331
TABLE 2 Frequency of Good Match and Bad Match Outcomes
Current
CEO Status
Full
Sample
Previous CEO Quit
Previous CEO
Dismissed
Inside Outside Inside Outside
Good match 309
(79)
212
(83)
20
(67)a
49
(74)
28
(72)
Bad match:
Quit 35
(9)
21
(8)
5
(17)
4
(6)
5
(13)
Dismissed 48
(12)
24
(9)
5
(17)
13
(20)b
6
(15)
N 392 257 30 66 39
Note.—The final sample consists of 392 job matches. Three hundred and nine (79%) of the job matches
endure beyond 3 years and are classified as good matches. Eighty-three (21%) of the job matches end in the
first 3 years of a CEO’s tenure and are defined as bad matches. Within bad matches, quits represent all CEO
turnovers arising from retirement or normal management succession or involving the CEO’s departure for a
prestigious position elsewhere; dismissals are forced resignations owing to pressure from the board of directors,
pressure from outside blockholders, pressure from bank lenders, policy or personality disagreements, demotion,
firing, scandal, poor performance, bankruptcy, and reorganization. All turnovers for which no reason is given
and the CEO is younger than 60 years of age are classified as dismissals; otherwise, they are classified as
quits. Outside identifies CEOs initially hired from outside the firm and is defined as a CEO who assumes the
position within 1 year of joining the firm. The number in parentheses is the column percent.
a The percentage of outside CEOs is significantly different from the percentage of inside CEOs at the 1%
level.
b The percentage of outside CEOs is significantly different from the percentage of inside CEOs at the 5%
level.
the youths depicted in the NLSY and that the cost of turnover for our sample
of CEOs is much higher than for the youths making up Farber’s non-CEO
sample.
D. An Explicit Test of Matching
According to Khurana and Nohria (2000), the best matches between a firm
and a CEO should be when inside CEOs replace CEOs who quit and when
outside CEOs replace dismissed CEOs. Table 2 provides some evidence to
support Khurana and Nohria. Table 2 shows the frequency of good and bad
matches for current CEOs for four subgroups: inside CEOs replacing CEOs
who quit, inside CEOs replacing dismissed CEOs, outside CEOs replacing
CEOs who quit, and outside CEOs replacing dismissed CEOs.17 The likelihood
of an inside CEO being a good match after the previous CEO quit is signif-
icantly greater (83%) than the likelihood of an outside CEO being a good
match (67%). We do not find evidence suggesting that outside CEOs who
replace dismissed CEOs are more likely to be good matches than insiders
who replace dismissed CEOs. Table 2 suggests that there is little difference
between the likelihood of a good match when replacing a dismissed CEO
with an insider (74%) or an outsider (72%). Also consistent with match theory,
we find that inside CEOs are twice as likely to be dismissed if they replace
dismissed CEOs than if they replace CEOs who quit.
17. The distinction between quit and dismissal of the previous CEO is not restricted to
turnovers in the first 3 years of CEO tenure.
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V. Multinomial Logit Results
The previous section described evidence consistent with the job match model
using nonparametric statistical methods. To continue our focus on explaining
early CEO turnover, we estimate a multinomial logit model with three possible
outcomes for a given observation: good match, bad match that ends with a
quit, or bad match that ends with a dismissal. The multinomial logit model
maximizes a likelihood function based on the cumulative logistic distribution,
and the model is normalized by setting the parameters of the outcome as-
sociated with good match to zero. The marginal effects of each variable on
the likelihood of a good match are not zero, however. Tables 3 and 4 provide
the marginal effects for each variable for all three outcomes. Marginal effects
are evaluated at the mean of the overall data.
A. Discussion of Results
Many of the results in table 3 are consistent with the findings of the simple
mean comparisons reported in table 1. For example, older CEOs are more
likely to quit early in their tenure and less likely to be dismissed. The signs
of the marginal effects of the four current performance variables in table 3
are the same as in table 1. In panel A of table 3, we find that current per-
formance, measured as industry-adjusted average ROA and average return,
is positive (negative) and significant for a good match (bad match–dismissal).
We also find in panel B of table 3 that both ROA difference and return
difference increase the likelihood of a good match. We interpret this as evi-
dence that current good matches tend to improve on the performance of the
previous CEO. Similarly, there is a negative and significant relationship be-
tween changes in firm performance and the likelihood of observing a bad
match that ends with dismissal. In results not reported, we include a variable
in the model specifications shown in panel A of table 3 that measures average
performance under the previous CEO. Even though panel B of table 3 shows
that both difference variables are significant in explaining the likelihood of
observing a good match or a bad match that ends in dismissal, the previous
CEO performance variables alone are not significant. The insignificance of
the previous CEO performance measure suggests that previous good or poor
performance by itself is irrelevant in determining subsequent match quality.
Instead, the relevant measure of match quality is whether the new CEO per-
forms at least as well as the previous CEO.
In table 1, we show that, while good and bad matches are equally likely
to follow a founder, 11% of the current CEOs who quit follow a previous
CEO who was a founder, which is five times greater than for dismissals.
Similarly, table 3 shows that a CEO replacing a founder is more likely to
quit. These new CEOs reflect the first attempt by these firms to hire a CEO.
It is likely that the founder had a role in the selection of the successor and
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remained on the board.18 Thus, our results suggest that the founder may not
fully relinquish control of the firm when the new CEO takes over and the
new CEO is unable to run the firm as he or she wishes. Alternatively, CEOs
chosen to follow founders, 75% of whom are insiders, may be chosen with
the implicit understanding that they serve on an interim basis.
In an attempt to control for unobserved heterogeneity, we include in the
model a variable that captures whether the previous CEO was a bad match
(had a tenure of 3 years or less). Consistent with table 1, table 3 shows a
positive relation between previous bad match and the likelihood of a current
bad match that ends in dismissal (see cols. 3 and 6 in both panels A and B).
We find a negative relation between previous bad match and the likelihood
of a current good match, which may simply reflect that firms differ in their
propensity to induce turnover. Alternatively, the previous bad match may put
pressure on the current CEO to produce rapid results, not just in measurable
firm performance but also in terms of providing leadership and stability (Ger-
stein and Reisman 1983).
Although early turnover of the previous CEO leads to early turnover of the
current CEO, the dismissal of the previous CEO does not alter the likelihood
of a good match. In addition, table 3 provides no evidence of differences
between inside versus outside replacements with respect to the likelihood of
observing a good match or a bad match. However, our earlier discussion
suggests that the interaction between dismissals and inside versus outside
replacements has job match implications (table 2). Table 4 shows the results
of reestimating our model but allowing for the interaction of the outside and
previous dismissal dummy variables. We define three interaction dummy var-
iables as follows: quit/outside equals one if the previous CEO quits and is
replaced by an outsider; dismissed/inside equals one if the previous CEO is
dismissed and is replaced by an insider; dismissed/outside equals one if the
previous CEO is dismissed and is replaced by an outsider. The omitted cat-
egory is quit/inside, which defines when the previous CEO quits and is re-
placed by an insider. Panel A of table 4 reports results measuring performance
using industry-adjusted average ROA and return. Panel B of table 4 reports
results measuring performance using the ROA and return difference variables.
The interpretation of the results presented in table 4 depends on the per-
formance variable. In particular, none of the interaction variables are significant
when firm performance is defined as current average ROA or average return
(panel A of table 4). One possible explanation for the lack of significance is
that current performance is correlated with previous performance and previous
18. Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) find a high correlation between founder status of the
CEO and the involvement of the CEO in selecting new directors. Similarly, it follows that founders
are likely to be involved in selecting their own successor. Seventy-nine percent of the founders
in our sample remain on the board after a new CEO is appointed.
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TABLE 3 Multinomial Logit Model of the Likelihood of a Good or Bad Match for Four Measures of Firm Performance
A. Defining Current Performance as Industry-Adjusted Average ROA or Return
Average ROA Average Return
Variable Good Match Bad Match–Quit Bad Match–Dismissed Good Match Bad Match–Quit Bad Match–Dismissed
Constant .3949* .6805** .2855* .4364* .6622** .2258
(2.26) (5.64) (2.06) (2.43) (5.57) (1.64)
Current CEO:
Age .0032 .0101** .0069** .0034 .0099** .0064**
(1.15) (5.59) (2.98) (1.23) (5.48) (2.83)
Log (sales) .0106 .0029 .0077 .0074 .0032 .0043
(.76) (.37) (.63) (.53) (.40) (.35)
Outside .0140 .0311 .0451 .0202 .0276 .0074
(.30) (1.18) (1.11) (.44) (1.06) (.19)
Performance .5903** .0690 .6593** .3222** .0322 .2900**
(3.03) (.59) (4.02) (3.64) (.65) (3.84)
Previous CEO:
Founder .0030 .0646* .0942 .0027 .0693 .0665
(.32) (1.78) (1.06) (.03) (1.88) (.73)
Dismissed .0071 .0134 .0205 .0206 .0153 .0359
(.18) (.55) (.63) (.53) (.62) (1.13)
Bad match .1123* .0338 .0785* .1048* .0359 .0689
(2.41) (1.18) (2.08) (2.24) (1.27) (1.82)
Log-likelihood 219.17 222.78
x2 79.41 72.20
N 392 392
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B. Defining Performance as ROA (Return) Difference Calculated as Average ROA (Return) for Current CEO Minus Average ROA (return) for Previous CEO
ROA Difference Return Difference
Variable Good Match Bad Match–Quit Bad Match–Dismissed Good Match Bad Match–Quit Bad Match–Dismissed
Constant .4593** .6646** .2053 .4511** .6600** .2089
(2.61) (5.60) (1.44) (2.55) (5.61) (1.45)
Current CEO:
Age .0040 .0099** .0060* .0039 .0099** .0060*
(1.37) (5.57) (2.46) (1.34) (5.54) (2.45)
Log (sales) .0116 .0033 .0082 .0121 .0032 .0088
(.81) (.42) (.65) (.85) (.43) (.71)
Outside .0066 .0280 .0214 .0279 .0286 .0007
(.14) (1.09) (.50) (.58) (1.11) (.02)
Performance .4663* .0456 .4207** .1674** .0434 .1239*
(2.24) (.36) (2.51) (2.60) (1.19) (2.24)
Previous CEO:
Founder .0506 .0680 .1186 .0398 .071** .1109
(.51) (1.87) (1.22) (.40) (1.97) (1.13)
Dismissed .0223 .0159 .0387 .0296 .0128 .0424
(.56) (.65) (1.13) (.73) (.53) (1.24)
Bad match .1204* .0347 .0856* .1177* .0373 .0804*
(2.48) (1.23) (2.14) (2.43) (1.35) (2.00)
Log-likelihood 227.27 222.16
x2 63.21 63.44
N 392 392
Note.—The final sample consists of 392 job matches. Three hundred and nine (79%) job matches endure beyond 3 years and are classified as good matches. Eighty-three (21%) job
matches end in the first 3 years of a CEOs tenure and are defined as bad matches. Of the bad matches, 48 (58%) are dismissals and 35 (42%) are quits. The current CEO performance
measure is calculated using, at most, the first 3 years of the current CEO’s tenure. The previous CEO performance measure is calculated using, at most, the last 3 years of the previous
CEO’s tenure. Statistics for age and sales are for the third year of the CEO’s tenure or for his or her last year in office, whichever comes first. Outside identifies CEOs initially hired from
outside the firm and is defined as a CEO who assumes the position within 1 year of joining the firm. Founder identifies CEOs who are founders of the firm. Quits represent all CEO turnovers
arising from retirement, normal management succession, or those involving the CEO’s departure for a prestigious position elsewhere. Dismissals are forced resignations owing to pressure
from the board of directors, pressure from outside blockholders, pressure from bank lenders, policy or personality disagreements, demotion, firing, scandal, poor performance, bankruptcy,
and reorganization. All turnovers for which no reason is given and the CEO is younger than 60 years of age are classified as dismissals; otherwise, they are classified as quits.
 Statistically significant at the 10% level.
* Statistically significant at the 5% level.
** Statistically significant at the 1% level.
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TABLE 4 Multinomial Logit Model of the Likelihood of a Good or Bad Match, Controlling for the Interaction Effect Associated with Whether the
Previous CEO Quit or Was Dismissed and Whether the Current CEO Is an Insider or an Outsider
A. Defining Current Performance as Industry-Adjusted Average ROA or Return
Average ROA Average Return
Variable Good Match Bad Match–Quit Bad Match–Dismissed Good Match Bad Match–Quit Bad Match–Dismissed
Constant .4125* .6810** .2685* .4425** .6615** .2190*
(2.37) (5.60) (1.98) (2.55) (5.52) (1.60)
Current CEO:
Age .0035 .0101** .0066** .0035 .0099** .0064**
(1.25) (5.59) (2.91) (1.26) (5.48) (2.80)
Log (sales) .0109 .0030 .0079 .0077 .0032 .0046
(.78) (.37) (.66) (.55) (.40) (.38)
Performance .5683** .0688 .6371** .3120** .0332 .2788**
(3.03) (.59) (4.13) (3.52) (.67) (3.68)
Previous CEO:
Quit/outside .0386 .0287 .0099 .0603 .0259 .0344
(.66) (.85) (.20) (1.00) (.78) (.68)
Dismissed/outside .0425 .0194 .0619 .0201 .0132 .0069
(.67) (.59) (1.09) (.34) (.41) (.14)
Dismissed/inside .0272 .0153 .0426 .0367 .0172 .0539
(.61) (.49) (1.25) (.81) (.55) (1.55)
Founder .0247 .0645 .0892 .0020 .0691 .0671
(.27) (1.77) (1.02) (.02) (1.87) (.73)
Bad match .1168** .0335 .0833* .1076* .0357 .0719
(2.52) (1.16) (2.25) (2.29) (1.25) (1.89)
Log-likelihood 217.99 222.14
x2 81.78 73.48
N 392 392
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B. Defining Performance as ROA (Return) Difference Calculated as Average ROA (Return) for Current CEO Minus Average ROA (return) for Previous CEO
ROA Difference Return Difference
Variable Good Match Bad Match–Quit Bad Match–Dismissed Good Match Bad Match–Quit Bad Match–Dismissed
Constant .4754** .6655** .1902 .4619** .6612** .1994
(2.71) (5.56) (1.36) (2.62) (5.57) (1.40)
Current CEO:
Age .0042 .0099** .0058* .0040 .0099** .0059*
(1.45) (5.57) (2.41) (1.39) (5.54) (2.44)
Log (sales) .0117 .0033 .0084 .0122 .0032 .0089
(.82) (.42) (.67) (.86) (.42) (.72)
Performance .4821* .0041 .4411** .1695** .0433 .1263*
(2.34) (.33) (2.65) (2.66) (1.18) (2.32)
Previous CEO:
Quit/outside .0699 .0261 .0438 .0901 .0269 .0632
(1.15) (.79) (.84) (1.46) (.81) (1.19)
Dismissed/outside .0056 .0130 .0186 .0273 .0166 .0107
(.09) (.40) (.34) (.45) (.53) (.20)
Dismissed/inside .0483 .0176 .0659 .0544 .0148 .0692
(1.05) (.56) (1.82) (1.19) (.49) (1.90)
Founder .0488 .0680 .1169 .0419 .0713* .1132
(.50) (1.85) (1.22) (.42) (1.97) (1.16)
Bad match .1255** .0344 .0911* .1214** .0372 .0842
(2.60) (1.20) (2.31) (2.52) (1.34) (2.12)
Log-likelihood 225.87 225.87
x2 66.02 66.01
N 392 392
Note.—The final sample consists of 392 job matches. Three hundred and nine (79%) job matches endure beyond 3 years and are classified as good matches. Eighty-three (21%) job matches end in
the first 3 years of a CEO’s tenure and are defined as bad matches. Forty-eight (58%) of the bad matches are dismissals and 35 (42%) are quits. The current CEO performance measure is calculated
using, at most, the first 3 years of the current CEO’s tenure. The previous CEO performance measure is calculated using, at most, the last 3 years of the previous CEO’s tenure. Statistics for age and
sales are for the third year of the CEO’s tenure or for his or her last year in office, whichever comes first. Outside identifies CEOs initially hired from outside the firm and is defined as a CEO who
assumes the position within 1 year of joining the firm. Founder identifies CEOs who are founders of the firm. Bad match is defined as a CEO tenure that ends in the first 3 years. Quits represent all CEO
turnovers arising from retirement or normal management succession or those involving the CEO’s departure for a prestigious position elsewhere. Dismissals are forced resignations owing to pressure from
the board of directors, pressure from outside blockholders, pressure from bank lenders, policy or personality disagreements, demotion, firing, scandal, poor performance, bankruptcy, and reorganization.
All turnovers for which no reason is given and the CEO is younger than 60 years of age are classified as dismissals. Otherwise, they are classified as quits. We define three interaction dummy variables
as follows: quit/outside equals one if the previous CEO quits and is replaced by an outsider; dismissed/inside equals one if the previous CEO is dismissed and is replaced by an insider; dismissed/outside
equals one if the previous CEO is dismissed and is replaced by an outsider. The omitted category is quit/inside, which defines when the previous CEO quits and is replaced by an insider.
 Statistically significant at the 10% level.
* Statistically significant at the 5% level.
** Statistically significant at the 1% level.
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dismissal and previous performance are correlated.19 The difference variables
measure if the current CEO performs better or worse than the previous CEO,
which is not correlated with whether or not the previous CEO was dismissed.
Panel B of table 4 shows, as predicted, that inside CEOs are more likely to
be dismissed if the previous CEO was dismissed than if the previous CEO
quit. We also expected a higher likelihood of turnover for outside CEOs
following a CEO who quit, but we find no evidence of this. The insignificance
of the dismissed/outside variable, however, is consistent with our expectation
that the best matches would arise from insiders following CEOs who quit and
outsiders following CEOs who are dismissed.
B. Sensitivity Analysis
To determine the sensitivity of our results to our definition of bad match (3
years or less of CEO tenure), we redefine bad match as less than or equal to
4 years of CEO tenure and then reestimate the regressions shown in tables 3
and 4. Our results are largely the same, and in some cases they strengthen
the support for job match theory in the CEO labor market. For example, the
results reported in tables 3 and 4 show an insignificant relation between sales
and the likelihood of observing various match outcomes. In our sensitivity
analysis, however, good matches (bad match–dismissal) are positively (neg-
atively) related to sales. The significance of sales is consistent with previous
research, which suggests that matching is less important at larger firms (Bishop
1990) and that CEOs tend to be of higher ability at larger firms (Hayes and
Schaefer 1999).
When reestimating table 3, we find that the outside and dismissal dummy
variables remain insignificant. However, the table 4 sensitivity results indicate
that the variable designating when a previous CEO is dismissed and replaced
by an insider remains positive and statistically significant. We also find some
evidence that outside CEOs are more likely to be dismissed than inside CEOs
if the previous CEO quit, but only when measuring performance using ROA
difference and return difference .20(pp .12) (pp .06)
Contrary to what we find in tables 3 and 4, the sensitivity results indicate
that good matches and bad match dismissals are statistically unrelated to
previous bad match but that bad matches that end as quits are more likely to
occur following a bad match. However, we noted in our previous discussion
that the original results may reflect differences in the firms’ propensity to
induce turnover. The sensitivity results do not support this interpretation and
suggest the need for additional research into the relationship between the
previous CEO’s and the current CEO’s tenure.
19. Current average ROA (return) and previous average ROA (return) have a correlation
coefficient of .64 (.34) and a p-value of .00 (.00). Previous average ROA (return) and dismissal
have a correlation coefficient of .11 (.02) and a p-value of .04 (.72).
20. The sensitivity results also indicate that the likelihood of being a good match decreases
with age, which simply reflects the higher likelihood that older CEOs will quit with more years
of tenure.
CEO/Firm Match 339
VI. Conclusion
Overall, we find evidence that is consistent with observing job-match het-
erogeneity in the CEO labor market. Consistent with the prediction of Jov-
anovic’s (1979b) model of job match, we find that the hazard initially increases
until the fifth year of CEO tenure and then decreases. Match theory also
suggests that good matches are characterized by better firm performance than
bad matches. We find a positive (negative) relation between firm performance
and the likelihood of a firm experiencing a good match (bad match–dismissal).
Thus, match theory is an alternative explanation for the empirical regularity
that firm performance is inversely related to the likelihood of turnover. We
also find evidence that good matches tend to improve on the performance of
the previous CEO, whereas CEOs who are bad matches that end in dismissal
do not improve on the performance of the previous CEO. Finally, our evidence
suggests a link between the reason for the previous CEO’s departure and an
inside versus outside replacement. Specifically, we find that inside replace-
ments are more likely to be dismissed if the previous CEO was dismissed
than if the previous CEO quit. Our results tend to support the idea that the
best matches arise from insiders following CEOs who quit and outsiders
following CEOs who are dismissed.
Job-match heterogeneity as an explanation for turnover in the CEO labor
market does not suggest that incentive problems and monitoring of CEOs are
less important. The prevalence of job-match heterogeneity does suggest, how-
ever, that more research must be done to further the understanding of what
determines the success or failure of a CEO-firm match. As described by
Khurana and Nohria (2000), much of the previous research on executive
turnover treats the departures of previous CEOs and the origin of new CEOs
as independent events. Yet, they argue that these factors are “intimately related
processes with respect to their effects on organization outcomes” (p. 3). As
Kesner and Sebora (1994) point out, CEO succession is likely to be a traumatic
event for a firm since it affects the members of the firm as well as the economic
and political climate of the firm. Therefore, the better able a firm is to match
the CEO to the firm and avoid early turnover, the more stability is provided
to the organization, since a good match is characterized by better performance
than a bad match. We believe that we have taken the first step in attempting
to analyze CEO turnover in the context of job match theory in order to better
understand what factors may increase the likelihood of choosing a CEO that
will endure.
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